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Abstract 
The paper contributes to the empirical literature on M&A deals performed by SOEs 
with a detailed analysis of the reported rationales from a sample of SOE-led 
acquisitions over the last decade. The sample includes 355 worldwide M&A deals 
performed by SOEs as acquirers over the period 2002-2012. The data set was 
obtained by combining firm-level information from two sources, Zephyr and Orbis 
(Bureau Van Dijk). The analysis is on a case-by-case basis for the rationales of the 
sample. Overall, the most important message arising from our analysis is that rescue 
of firms in financial distress is a relatively minor one role played by contemporary 
SOEs in spite of the Great Recession, while shareholder value maximization and long 
term strategic goals are more frequently the objective of the observed deals. 
Keywords: State-owned enterprises, M&As, nationalization, privatization. 
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I. Introduction 
In recent years there has been an increase in the number of academic 
publications on the contemporary SOE’s1, and their differences from and 
similarities to private firms. The growing attention is motivated not only by the 
expanding size of SOE’s2, but also by significant changing dynamics that have 
shaped their contemporary features and role.  In fact, contemporary SOEs have 
been strongly reorganized, in terms of governance rules, regulatory framework, 
business reengineering, accountability and transparency standards, and they 
have become more mixed enterprises, with enhanced competitive capabilities 
and facing similar issues and challenges than private enterprises (Lebedev 
et al., 2015; Florio, 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; He et al., 2016; 
Musacchio et al., 2015; Bruton et al., 2015). Besides, contemporary SOEs more 
and more frequently play a relevant function in promoting research and 
innovation, in fostering long-term and/or high risk capital intensive projects 
(De Olloqui, 2013; Millward, 2011; Eslava and Freixas, 2016), and in channeling 
funds to long-term societal challenges (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). 
Among recent publications, a rising number of papers is focusing on M&A 
(Lebedev et al., 2015; Karolyi and Liao, 2016; Clò et al., 2016, Bacchiocchi et al., 
2017; Del Bo et al., 2016; Cheng and Young, 2010; Wu and Xie, 2010; Xie et al., 
2017; Reddy et al., 2016). The reason for such a specific interest in this one 
important aspect of the new activisim of SOE’s is the role they are playing in 
the Market for Corporate Control (MCC), where they are acquirers in a 
significant number of deals – both domestic and cross-border – and for a 
significant amount of assets. In the last decade the cumulative value of the 
targets’ assets purchased by SOE’s was reported to be no less than 
690 billion Euros that is 30% of the total assets of the targets traded in the 
M&A arena (Clò et al., 2015). In the same period, in the financial industry, more 
than 10% of M&A deals have involved state-owned banks as acquirers 
(Bacchiocchi et al., 2017).  Governments also acquire assets in the MCC through 
Sovereign Wealth Funds, which are the fastest growing class of asset owners 
since 2000, with a reported size of around 5 trillion dollars, and regularly invest 
                                                          
1
 “A state-owned enterprise is: ultimately owned or co-owned by the national or local government; 
internalizing a public mission among their objectives; enjoying full or partial budgetary autonomy; exhibiting a 
certain extent of managerial discretion; operating mainly in a market environment, and for which (full) 
privatization would in principle or de facto be possible, but for some reasons, it is not a policy option” Florio 
(2014, p. 201). 
2
 SOEs are growing globally: over the last decade, the worlds’ 2,000 largest SOEs have combined more than 
6 million employees, operating revenues equal to 19% of global cross-border sales, aggregate sales for 6% of 
the world GNI, and nowadays they represent approximately 10% of global gross domestic product (Bruton 
et al., 2015; Christiansen, 2011; Kowalski and Perepechay, 2015). 
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in listed and unlisted targets in developed and emerging markets (Bortolotti 
et al., 2015). 
The goal of our paper is to contribute to this recent field of finance literature 
with a detailed analysis of the main reported rationales behind a sample of 
SOE-led M&A’s over the last decade. Specifically, we analyze to what extent 
recent changes that are reshaping the overall activity of contemporary SOE’s 
are also affecting their strategic investment choices and behaviors in the MCC, 
and whether acquirer motivations are more aligned with the rationales 
traditionally identified in the empirical literature for private firms. Why is a firm 
that is ultimately owned by a government willing to acquire another state-
owned or private-owned enterprise? Is there any similarity with the rationales 
underlying private-owned enterprise deals? Or are they motivated by the need 
to reach strategic social or welfare goals, particularly after the Great 
Recession? 
Our sample includes a detailed study of 355 worldwide M&A deals performed 
by SOE’s as acquirers over the period 2002-2012. The deals’ rationales are 
reported by Zephyr (Bureau Van Dijk) based on a variety of sources. 
Additionally, Zephyr provides information on the global ultimate owner (GUO) 
for each acquirer, and vendor and target involved in each deal. Given that the 
GUO provided by Zephyr refers only to the latest available year, rather than the 
year the deal occurred, we had first to resolve ownership identification issues, 
to avoid potential sampling errors due to wrongly considering as government-
owned (private-owned) a firm that is currently government-owned (private-
owned) but was not at the time of the deal. We therefore developed an ad-hoc 
algorithm to correctly infer the ownership nature of the enterprises at the time 
the deal took place. Furthermore, we double-checked the identity of the GUO 
of the remaining 355 deals by visual inspection. We then analyzed motivations 
through a case-by-case analysis and classified them into several categories, 
thereby providing a taxonomy of rationales behind SOE M&A’s and speculating 
on their differences and similarities relative to private firms. Within our sample, 
around 80% of the deals is represented by majority acquisitions, of these 143 
deals are total acquisitions. A considerable share of deals are cross-border 
(43%), and the concentration of deals is higher in the finance, electricity and 
mining industries. 
Our main finding is that the most common motivation behind acquisitions 
performed by SOE’s is shareholder-value maximization, by means of expected 
efficiency gains, increase in market power, and risk diversification. This 
rationale is not different from that of a private firm, in line with recent findings 
that suggest that modern SOE’s are more finance- and market-oriented than in 
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the last century and that they offer public services in a more business-like 
manner (Aivazian et al., 2005; Bozec and Breton, 2003; Levesque, 2003; Grossi 
et al., 2015; Clò et al., 2015; Lebedev et al., 2015; Florio, 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra 
et al., 2014; He et al., 2016; Musacchio et al., 2015; Bruton et al., 2015). 
Moreover, we detect a group of deals that are driven by motivations which 
specifically relate to the role of modern state capitalism in the economy, such 
as the development of innovative sectors (e.g. renewable and environmental-
friendly energy), and the pursuit of national strategic goals by means of rent 
extraction and accumulation of resources. M&A’s for the purpose of bailing-out 
distressed firms deviates from the principle of value maximization, but we find 
that this is far from being the main rationale of SOE M&A’s. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an 
overview of the theoretical framework and a taxonomy of corporate M&A 
rationales. Section 3 describes our data set of deals performed by SOEs as 
acquirers. Section 4 focuses on SOEs deals rational and discusses the main 
findings. Section 5 concludes. 
2. M&A rationales in the corporate firm literature 
Since Manne’s seminal paper (1965), a substantial academic literature on M&A 
activity has developed. This extensive literature collects contributions from 
different academic fields - including finance, management, industrial 
organization, and business administration - and analyze the phenomenon from 
multifarious viewpoints, such as stock market reactions and pre- and post-
merger accounting performance (De Young et al., 2009; Andrade and Stafford, 
2004; Breinlich, 2008; Agrawal and Jaffe, 1995; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 
2004), differences between domestic and cross-border deals (Reddy, 2015; 
Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Erel et al., 2012; Karolyi and Liao, 2015; Ferreira et al., 
2009; Bris et al., 2008; Coeurdacier et al., 2009), waves clustered by industries 
(Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Harford, 2005; Andrade and Stafford, 2004; 
Hackbarth and Miao, 2012), impact on competition, economic growth and 
innovation (Craig and Hardee, 2007; Carow et al., 2006; Cassiman et al., 2005; 
Piscitello, 2004; Wand and Wong, 2009). All these different analyses have 
contributed to the elucidation a crucial underlying relevant question: why do 
firms enter into M&A deals? 
From a corporate finance perspective, the rationales behind M&A deals can be 
distinguished into two broad categories: shareholder value maximization, and 
utility maximization of other stakeholders, including firms’ managers. In the 
first case, firms enter M&A deals to increase the shareholder value of the 
merged firms by means of efficiency gains (Weston et al., 1990; 
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Houston et al., 2001), risk reduction in terms of product and geographical 
diversification (Amihud and Baruch, 1981; Denis et al., 2002), and increase in 
market power through entering a new market or reducing competition (Martin 
and McConnell, 1991; Gugler et al., 2003; Lanine and Vennet, 2007). The utility 
maximization motive refers, conversely, to the maximization of managers’ or 
other stakeholders’ utility rather than the enterprise value for shareholders. 
For example, according to principal-agent theory, managers may indeed have 
an incentive to make a merger in order to maximize their own compensation 
(or their ego), or build a personal empire, or live a “quiet life”, rather than to 
maximize the shareholder/enterprise value (Jensen, 1986; Matsusaka, 1993). 
Managers of politically connected firms (Faccio, 2006) may also consider the 
utility of other stakeholders, such as politicians (Luo and Tung, 2007). 
Within the M&A literature, little attention has been devoted to acquisitions 
undertaken by SOE’s (Lebedev et al., 2015, p. 660). Only recently there has 
been a rising interest in M&A deals performed by government-owned acquirers 
specifically. For example, Karolyi and Liao (2016) focus on 127,786 cross-border 
M&A deals over the period 1990-2008 with the aim of analyzing differences 
and similarities compared to equivalent private sector activities. They find that 
government-owned acquirers and corporate acquirers are similar in their 
behavior on the Market for Corporate Control, in particular in pursuing smaller 
targets, in related industries, with fewer growth opportunities. Clò et al. (2016) 
analyze a sample of 24,726 deals worldwide, 10% of which involving a 
government-owned acquirer, and find that SOE’s takeover underperforming 
targets on average, similarly to private firms; results are stronger when the 
government owns more than 50% of shares. Likewise, Bacchiocchi et al. (2017) 
focus on the financial industry and analyze 3,682 deals involving banks during 
the last decade. They find that state-owned financial institutions that are active 
in the Market for Corporate Control are at least as efficient and profitable as 
their private benchmarks, and this finding is clearly stronger for development 
banks versus commercial state-owned banks.  Focusing on cross-border M&A 
by Chinese companies, Wu and Xie (2010) find, for the acquirer, a positive 
relationship between state-ownership and performance.  The opposite result is 
found in Chen and Young (2010) for the Chinese firms and Bertrand and 
Betschinger (2012) in the Russian market: both showed a negative relationship 
between state-ownership and acquirer’s performance. See also Del Bo et al. 
(2016) who focus on the pre-deal characteristics of acquirers in deals involving 
SOE’s (including privatisation). 
All these papers have analyzed differences and similarities in the performance 
of SOE’s M&A deals compared to private enterprises, and have only focused 
indirectly on the motivation behind deals. Conversely, the novelty of our paper 
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is that we focus directly on the rationales for SOE deals, as reported by 
managers before the deal occurred and from other sources, with the aim to 
identify differences and similarities with the above mentioned motivations. The 
working hypothesis we want to study in our paper is the following: 
Deviation Hypothesis 
H0: M&A reported rationales of deals with a SOE as acquirer differ from the 
rationales of private firms because SOE’s objectives deviates from shareholder 
value-maximization and are bounded by political objectives, consistently with 
previous traditional literature on SOE. 
However, recent evidence suggests an alternative working hypothesis. 
Convergence Hypothesis 
H1: following the recent literature trends on SOE’s, we expect there are not 
relevant differences in rationales since the goals between private and 
contemporary public enterprises are aligned. 
Our research question is simple: which one of the two alternative hypothesis is 
supported by the evidence? 
3. The data set 
Our data set was obtained by combining firm-level information from two 
sources: Zephyr and Orbis (Bureau Van Dijk)3. Zephyr contains information 
about the type, year and reported rationales of M&A deals. Additionally, for 
each acquirer, vendor and target involved in each deal, Zephyr provides 
information on the country, the NACE sector, and the global ultimate owner 
(GUO)4. However, since the GUO provided by Zephyr refers only to the latest 
available year, rather than the year when the deal occurred, we needed to 
develop an algorithm to extract only those observations for which both the 
vendor and the acquiring company involved in a deal (at time t) do not figure as 
                                                          
3
 https://www.bvdinfo.com 
4
 We consider as state-owned any enterprise whose ultimate owner, defined as the 
independent shareholder with the highest direct or total percentage of ownership, is a 
central or local government entity, public agency, authority or other public sector body. 
Furthermore, we consider the independent shareholder to be the ultimate owner (UO) of an 
enterprise if it holds more than 25 per cent of shares (usually regarded as granting control or 
at least a large influence in decision-making, see Christiansen and Kim, 2014). 
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target companies in a subsequent deal (at any time t+j)5. We have been able to 
identify 3,550 deals performed by SOE acquirers from the evidence available 
for the time span 2002-2012. We then matched Zephyr data with financial 
statement information provided by Orbis in order to have accounting data on 
the acquirers, and finally dropped deals without adequate accounting data or a 
description of the rationale. 
The result of this strict selection procedure is a worldwide sample of 355 M&A 
deals, for which we are sure that the acquirer is a SOE, for which accounting 
data are available and, critically for our research questions, for which the 
rationales for the deals are reported. Interestingly, almost 75% of the deals 
(260 deals) are “public-private”, that is an M&A where state-owned enterprises 
acquired a target company owned by a private vendor enterprise, while 25% of 
the deals (95 deals) are “public-public”, that is state-owned enterprises 
acquiring a company from a state-owned vendor6. 108 state-owned enterprises 
were involved as acquirers in the 355 deals. By comparison, the sample 
considered in Del Bo et al. (2016) includes 887 public-private deals, around 3% 
of the total (31,479) and around 54% of the deals with a public acquirer 
(1,638 Public-Public and Public-Private). In Clò et al. (2016) the public-private 
sample includes 1,034 deals, around 8% of the full sample (13,475) and around 
60% of the deals with a  public acquirer (1,724 deals). In our sample, which is 
restricted by the availability of reported evidences on the rationales, around 
73% of the total (355) are public-private deals. 
Figure 1 and table 1 provide information on the number of M&A’s performed 
by SOE’s broken down by geographical and sector distribution in our sample. 
The most significant features in our data are the high number of deals 
performed in Western Europe and Far East and Asia, in line with larger waves 
of nationalizations occurred in the last two decades (Voszka, 2017), and the 
considerable share of cross-border deals. In fact, although the number of 
domestic deals is higher than the number of cross-border deals (204 and 151 
respectively), the significant share of cross-border deals underlines the sizable 
participation of SOE’s in the market for cross-border acquisitions, in line with 
recent empirical evidences (Karolyi and Liao, 2016). 
                                                          
5
 Indeed, when defining the ownership type of any enterprise involved in the deal, there is 
the possibility to wrongly considering as state-owned a firm that is state-owned nowadays, 
but was not state-owned at the time of the deal. This misreading may happen both on the 
acquirer and on the target side. To avoid this potential error, we restricted our sample to 
those observations for which the ultimate owner of both the acquirer and the vendor has 
not changed since the time of the deal. 
6
 We use the term “state-owned” instead of “public” to indicate a state-owned enterprise 
because this term can be confused with the “publicly listed but privately owned firms”. 
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Deals are concentrated in three main industries: finance, electricity and mining. 
One third of the deals has been performed in the same NACE sector (4 digits). 
As far as the distribution of deals by sector of the acquirer, the highest shares 
belongs to finance (105 deals), electricity (44 deals), and mining (43 deals). 
Diversification strategies are mainly performed by financial acquirers, while for 
other industries acquisitions are mainly within the same sector or closer sectors 
(i.e. mining SOE’s invest in oil & gas; oil & gas SOE’s invest in transport). Not 
surprisingly, public-public deals are all domestic: they are mainly reorganization 
of public entities within national boundaries. State-owned enterprises in the 
finance, mining, telecommunication, and transportation industries acquire 
cross-border targets almost as frequently as domestic companies, while in the 
other industries acquisitions are mainly in-border. 
Figure 1 - Number of deals by macroareas 
 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
Table 1 - Number of deals by sectors 
Nace sectors Total deals  Deals in same sector Domestic deals  Cross-border deals  
Agriculture 4 2 4 - 
Construction 16 6 14 2 
Electricity 44 32 44 23 
Finance       105 46 55 50 
Manufacturing 33 19 19 14 
Mining 43 15 21 22 
Oil & Gas 5 0 2 3 
Other 18 10 15 3 
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Public 25 0 24                  1 
Telecom 25 21 11 14 
Transport 31 27 16 15 
Waste & Water 6 2 2 4 
Total       355 180 204              151 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
Regarding the distribution of deals over time, 116 deals were performed in the 
years prior the 2008 crisis, and almost 239 after the crisis. Among them, a 
significant number of deals are rescues motivated by financial distress of the 
target and performed by SOE’s in line with the countercyclical role they played 
after the crises. The median value of deals is around 200 thousand Euros, but a 
not negligible number of deals (6%) have a value greater than one billion Euros. 
Firms involved in the highest value deals are Saudi Industries Corporation, the 
Argentinean Government, Gazprom, Swisscom AG, China Huaneng Group, 
ABN AMRO Holding NV and Belgacom SA. Around 40% of the deals is 
represented by total acquisitions, another 40% by “majority acquisitions” 
(greater than 50% of stakes), and the remainder by acquisitions of minority 
shares. 
4. Reported rationale for M&A’s performed by SOE’s: Selected examples 
In this Section we focus on deals’ rationales, our main research interest in this 
paper. For each deal in our sample, Zephyr reports the motivation using several 
sources, among others declarations by the management of the firm involved in 
the agreement. We analyzed on a case-by-case basis all the rationales of our 
sample, and we classified them into several categories with the aim of 
identifying differences and similarities relative to private firms7.  
Our main finding is that the majority of SOE rationales for M&A deals are 
similar to those identified in the empirical literature for corporate firms. 
Indeed, the most frequently reported rationale is shareholder-value 
maximization, in the form of: 
o efficiency gains (technical, synergic); 
o increase in market power; 
o diversification. 
                                                          
7
 We are aware that any classification may simplify the complexity underlying deals’ 
rationales, since different motivations may not be exclusive to each other. For example, 
synergy gains may motivate mergers in search of strengthening market power, while 
technical efficiency may be pursued thought product and diversification strategies. We are 
also aware that non-profit maximization motives, clearly identified in empirical analysis, are 
unlikely to be explicitly declared as the rationale of the deal. 
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However, a not negligible number of deals are driven by different motivations, 
which specifically relate to the role of modern state capitalism in the economy. 
As it has been highlighted in recent literature on SOE’s, these rationales are not 
necessarily inconsistent with shareholder-value maximization8. 
A first group of deals rationale identifies the governments’ strategic policy to 
play an active role in: 
- the development of innovative projects, for example in the field of 
climate finance, renewable and environmentally-friendly energy; 
- the development of competitive physical and technological 
infrastructure, thought the acquisition of strategic enterprises or by 
means of strategic alliance. 
These deals are aimed at increasing capitalization in strategic and innovative 
sectors that require investments that are typically large-scale and risky, calling 
for patient capital and synergies in terms of know-how and R&D. We call this 
rationale “innovation”. 
A second group of deals identifies the governments’ political strategy to 
strengthen its competitive position in domestic and cross-border markets in 
order to extract rents or accumulate resources from subsoil, oil, gas, or mining, 
as well as to guarantee energy products and raw materials to serve the 
collective good of the country. Deals are typically performed by firms that 
belong to specific industries (mainly mining and oil and gas) and have a central 
role in the global economy, such as the oil giants Gazprom and Petroleo 
Brasileiro. We call this rationale “Rent-extraction”. 
A third group of M&A rationales relate to debt restructuring and bail-out of 
financially distressed firms arising because of severe market failures, such as 
the 2008 crisis. We call this rationale “financial distress”. 
In the next sections we report several examples of deals belonging to the 
different types of rationales. 
4.1. Shareholder’s value maximization 
The shareholder-value maximization rationale is spread across sectors and 
geographical areas and is the most prevalent motivation for SOE M&A deals. 
Similarly to private firms, government-owned enterprises also pursue this goal 
                                                          
8
 See Musacchio et al., 2014 for an analysis of strategic and governance implications of new 
varieties of state capitalism. 
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by means of higher levels of efficiency, diversification and risk reduction, 
increase in market power and entry into new markets. We report below some 
illustrative examples of motivations specifically relating to technical and 
strategic efficiency, diversification, and increase in market power. 
Technical and strategic efficiency 
The French Areva targeted a firm engaged in the provision of technological 
solutions for carbon dioxide-free nuclear power generation from the British 
Urenco with a purpose “to share knowledge of efficient, economic and 
environmentally friendly technology”. Increase in net income by means of 
economies of scale and scope is also the driver of the M&A deal performed by 
the Suisse Rual, which acquired 100% of Oerlikon Space in order to combine 
“businesses under one umbrella as a competitive aerospace supplier out of the 
three countries Switzerland, Sweden and Austria strengthens RUAG’s position 
and to open up new attractive opportunities for our customers and partners as 
well as our staff”. 
The Chinese manufacturing group Shanghai Electric acquired the North-
American Goss International Corporation, which was engaged in the wholesale 
distribution of printing trade machinery and equipment with an aim to “bring 
additional strength and financial resources to the business and further enhance 
the ability to innovate, execute and deliver value to customers through a 
unique, worldwide manufacturing and support platform that includes 
operations in Asia, Europe and the United States”. Similarly, the Suisse Sicap 
acquired the French Swapcom, engaged in computer programming activities, 
with an aim to “enable operators to drive new revenue opportunities, offers 
lower operating costs and increases customer satisfaction and loyalty”. 
Market power 
The Malesyan Th Plantation, a company principally involved in the cultivation 
of oil palm, acquired 100% of Ladang Bukit Belian, which was engaged in the 
business of growing of cereals and oil seeds “in order to strengthen the 
company’s business in Malaysia (…) with the aim to create the world’s largest 
oil palm plantation group with core business in motor vehicle, heavy 
equipment, property and energy utilities”. In a different sector, the financial 
company Abn Amro acquired a participation in the Belgian Bank Corluy 
Effectenbankiers “to strengthen our Belgian market position and the quality 
and expertise of our local services”, and the Norwegian Itella Information, 
which engaged in activities auxiliary to financial services, acquired 100% stake 
in the German Newsource GmbH, which was involved in the provision of 
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business process outsourcing (BPO) solutions, with the aim of becoming the 
European market leader in financial transaction processing services. 
Deals aimed at increasing market power are also found in the manufacturing 
sector as well as in the telecom sector. For example, the purchase of a 50% 
share in Gibtelecom (GI) by Telekom Slovenje (SI) is motivated by the goal of 
implementing an expansion strategy on developed European markets. The deal 
done by Saudi Telecom to buy Oger Telecom Ltd (AE) highlights the goal “to 
become the undisputed leader in the region”. Other transactions are operation 
of expansion or strategic initiatives in order to offer more landline broadband, 
based on fibre technology. For instance, Emirates Telecommunications 
purchased Tigo PVT, Belgacom bought Tele2 Luxemburg, and Telenor 
purchased Vimpelcom. 
Diversification 
Diversification is a rational for many M&A deals performed by financial 
companies acquiring firms operating in other industries. For example, 
Abn Amro acquired a participation in Baarsma Wine Group Holding with the 
following declared motivation: “Baarsma Wine Group is a young, dynamic and 
fast-growing company that has a clear vision. It has distinguished itself by its 
continuous efforts to develop ‘winning strategies in wine’ for its various 
operating companies. We have known the company since 2002, and see good 
opportunities for accelerating its ambition to become the European market 
leader in this segment”. Similarly, a Canadian company, the British Columbia 
Investment Management Corporation, which is engaged in Fund management 
activities, acquired a stake in the Delta Hotels Ltd and the comments of the 
managements were: “As Canada’s leading first class hotel brand, Delta is an 
ideal fit with bcIMC’s investment strategy to expand our diversified real estate 
portfolio to include hospitality. Delta’s brand recognition, experienced 
management and dedicated employees will be a strong complement to our 
diversified portfolio of assets”. 
Diversification is also the goal of M&A deals performed by SOEs active in other 
industries. The Malesyan Kencana, which is engaged in provision of offshore 
and onshore engineering, acquired Torsco Snd, which specialized in heavy steel 
fabrication, erection and piping installation, with the aim to “diversify its 
activities in the oil & gas related business and in the oil & gas fabrication 
industry in terms of size and capabilities”, while the Canada Pension Plan 
Investment board acquired 100% of the Chilean Sociedad Concesionaria 
Costanera Norte to expand its infrastructure portfolio in a developing market 
with a strong growth rate. 
16 
4.2. Innovation 
The innovation rationale drives a number of deals in the electricity sector; they 
are aimed at fostering innovations with impacts on the environment and 
climate, creating synergies and consolidation of enterprises with different 
technologies, and investing in infrastructure projects. 
For instance, the acquisition by Gazprom of a French company, Energie du 
Porcien, seems to have the aim of developing alternative energy and green 
projects in Russia since “it could be regarded as learning experience of green 
projects in Europe where the market has been actively developing during the 
last 20 years”. Other examples of such deals are the acquisition of Eoliennes de 
la Haute by GDF, in line with Gaz de France’s strategy to invest in wind 
generation companies, the purchase of Generadores Hydroeletricos sa 
Hidronorte by the Colombian enterprise Empresas Publicas de Medelin Esp, 
and the acquisition of Nuon International China BV by China Resource Power 
Holdings. Moreover, Enel’s entry into the US geothermal market AMP Resource 
Llc investing in North America confirms the commitment toward 
environmentally-friendly technologies to fight climate change. The Swedish 
company Vattenfall acquired 100% of the British Amec Wind Energy and the 
comment of the Chief Executive Officer of the Vattenfall Group was: “AMEC is 
one of the most respected and experienced engineering services companies in 
the utility sector, whose skills and resources in wind energy are complementary 
to our own. Vattenfall has ambitious plans within the renewable energy sector 
and we are delighted that AMEC’s UK Wind Developments business will be a 
part of our growing portfolio.” 
The innovation rationale is also related to the development of physical and 
technological infrastructures. For example, Terna Spa acquired the multi-utility 
Acea Spa and Aem Trasporto Energia Spa with the aim of starting a process of 
unification of the Italian grid and to upgrading one of the technological 
infrastructures essential to the country’s development, thus improving energy 
system safety and increasing the competitiveness of the Italian economic 
system. Rail Cargo Austria acquired the total shares of Mav Cargo Zrt to expand 
the railway transport in Central and Eastern Europe, while CFL Cargo purchased 
the Midcargo Ab to “extend their rail freight activities towards the north and 
add another Scandinavian country to their geographic range, which is an 
important factor when providing customized door-to-door services to our 
international customers”. In the local transport sector, we can also mention the 
acquisition of Tramtrack Croydon by the Transport Trading Ltd for improving 
the quality of services for citizens: “Bringing Tramlink into the control of TfL is 
excellent news for Londoners. This will mean we can plan how to make the 
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improvements that are required to cater for ever increasing numbers of 
passengers and provide them with the very best possible services”. 
4.3. Extraction of rent 
Gazprom, Qazmunaigaz, Petroleo Brasileiro are the acquirers mainly involved in 
these types of deals, which are aimed at strengthening the government’s 
position in strategic sectors like mining, oil and gas. From 2005 to 2010 
Gazprom performed several horizontal deals searching for strategic economic 
alliances. In particular, Gazprom (re)invested in domestic firms, as in Sakalin 
Energy Investment Company Ltd, with a strategy of entering in the liquefied 
natural gas market and developing an Asian market: “With the entry of 
Gazprom as Sakhalin Energy’s major shareholder, we are confident that in 
cooperation with the Russian Government, we can bring this first Russian 
frontier LNG project to completion, as scheduled, for delivery of LNG to our 
customers in Japan, Korea and the United States”. Gazprom also invested in 
Finnish companies in order to “start the realization of the project to build the 
North European pipeline”, and in Byelorussian companies “with both the 
objective global trends in hydrocarbon markets and the level of relationships in 
the gas industry taken into account”. 
The six deals performed by the Kazakhstani company Qazmunaigaz Barlau 
Ondiru AQ all involve extraction of oil and the manufacture of refined 
petroleum products. It is clear that this expansion affords it control of the new 
merged enterprises in order to increase the market position in the extraction of 
oil, hence this approach accords with  a strategic policy to expand and reinforce 
the extraction market also in Europe too, where most of the deals have been 
made with Nederland Enterprises. The targets of Qazmunaigaz are the Valsera 
Holdings and Rompetrol companies which, in turn, were owned by other 
foreign vendors. The aim of the managers was to return a very large asset to 
the country. 
The Brazilian company Petroleo Brasiliero is involved in acquisitions of cross-
country targets. The aim seems to be to expand and increase the ownership in 
the refined petroleum products sector across different geographical areas, such 
as Japan, the US, Poland and Uruguay for the sector of refined petroleum 
products. Here are some comments: “Petrobras will take control of the natural 
gas market in Uruguay. The acquisition fits in with Petrobras’ overall strategy of 
consolidating its position as a Latin American market leader” (after the 
acquisition of Gaseba Spa); “The acquisition allows Petrobras to continue is 
plans to expand into the US market”, after the acquisition of Pasadena Refining 
System Inc.; “The conclusion of this operation is in line with the objectives 
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established in the Strategic Plan for the consolidation of Petrobras as an 
integrated energy company with a strong international presence and 
leadership in Latin America. Such markets represent excellent potential for 
growth as well as synergies with existing assets held by the company 
throughout the region” (after the acquisition of Shell Uruguay SA). 
4.4. Financial distress 
The majority of deals driven by the financial distress motivation were 
performed after the 2008 financial crisis. They were mainly realized by 
government agencies or financial state-owned acquirers and are aimed at 
rescuing firms from financial distress. For example, in 2011 the Dubai 
government purchased all of the shares in Dubai Bank to help the bank pay off 
some debts. Société Fédérale de Participations et d’Investissement acquired 
Dexia Bank Belgium to pay off the loans granted by Dexia Bank Belgium to 
Dexia SA and Dexia Credit Local. Other similar operations have been done by 
Temasek, a holding owned by the government of Singapore, which acquired 
Banco the Bajìo from Banco de Sabadel because “the divesture of Banco del 
Bajío by Banco de Sabadell is part of the firm’s objectives of shoring up its 
capital levels following a difficult few years for the banks in Spain”, while GMAC 
Commercial Finance LLC acquired 100% of Betts Global Ltd with the following 
declared motivation: “Betts went into administration on 16/04/09, and has 
since been purchased by the banking consortium”. 
In other examples, in 2007 the Dutch municipality of Amsterdam acquired the 
total shares of the Beurs van Berlage Stichting, a company of creative, arts and 
entertainment activities that had a deficit of 7 million of euro, from the urban 
district of Stadsdeel Amsterdam-Centrum. The Arizona government also made 
a total acquisition of Pmi Mortgage Insurance, a non-life insurance company hit 
by the housing downturn; similarly, the Irish Government acquired 100% of the 
distressed insurance company Irish Life. 
A smaller number of deals that belong to this category is also represented by 
M&A aimed at restructuring the vendor’s debt and financial structure, that is 
deals where the sale of a company is performed to reorganize the public debt 
and to transfer the ownership to another state-owned company with private 
organization. In this case Zephyr reports the vendor, rather than the acquirer 
rationale. For instance, Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, the holding owned by the 
Italian government, purchased Simest Spa from the Minister of Economy and 
Finance in order to “reduce the Italian debt”. This type of operation of re-
organization of the public debt has also been done by Empresa de Energia de 
Bogotà when it acquired Empresa Colombiana de Gasfrom the Colombian 
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government to use the proceeds to buy back the foreign debt. Similarly, in 
2009 the Tasmanian government sold the total ownership of Tamar Valley 
Power Station in order to use the proceeds to repay the debt: “The sale of 
Tamar represents a significant de-risking for the BBP business which is a key 
step towards stabilization of BBP’s capital structure”. 
Table 2 summarizes the most recurring keywords in the reported rationales in 
Zephyr dataset. 
Table 2 - Keywords by deal type 
Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent-extraction Financial distress 
Economies of scale 
and scope; synergies; 
financial efficiency; 
risk reduction by 
means of product 
and geographic 
diversification; 
increase in market 
power. 
Green projects; 
climate change; 
energy system 
safety; fostering 
innovation; 
development of 
physical 
infrastructures; 
acquiring skills and 
know-how. 
Strategic sectors; 
government position; 
strategic economic 
alliances; market 
position; strategic 
plan; leadership; new 
market entry. 
Financial crisis; 
rescuing firms; 
restructuring the 
vendor’s debt; 
reorganization; 
stabilization; 
lowering the cost of 
capital. 
5. Empirical analysis 
In this Section we analyze the evidence that we have collected.  First of all, 
Table 3 highlights the distribution in the sample of the different groups of 
rationales according to our taxonomy. 
Table 3 - Number of deals by rationales 
Motivation  Number of deals        % 
Shareholders-value maximization 227 (63.9%) 
Innovation   45 (12.9%) 
Rent extraction   47 (13.2%) 
Financial distress   36 (10.14%) 
Total 335 (100%) 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
Almost 64% of the deals performed by SOEs as acquirers are driven by 
shareholder-value maximization motives. As for rationales that accord with the 
role of modern state capitalism in the economy, “innovation” and “rent 
extraction” each drive nearly 13% of all deals, while financial distress accounts 
for 10% of the deals. 
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The rationale “shareholder-value maximization” is spread across all sectors 
(Table 4); conversely the others are more focused on specific sectors. Indeed, 
rescue from financial distress is more typical for finance and public 
administration acquirers (with a peak in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis – 
Table 5), “Innovation” is more relevant in the electricity industry and in 
developed countries, while “rent extractions” mainly belongs to the mining and 
oil & gas sector, with a higher incidence in South and Central America and 
Eastern countries. 
Domestic deals are more common than cross-border deals in all the groups of 
rationales, apart from the rent-extraction motivation, where the number of 
cross-border deals is higher, in line with the need underlying this rationale to 
increase market power (Table 6). 
In terms of share of acquisition, around 80% of deals are represented by 
majority acquisitions (greater than 50% stake). Among them, 143 deals are 
total acquisitions, with no relevant differences between the four types of deals. 
Concerning the distribution by type of vendor (Table 7), public-public deals - 
that is target acquired from a state-owned vendor - are mainly concentrated in 
the rent-extraction rationale, which typically involves a government-owned 
industry. The other public-public deals are equally spread among the remaining 
rationale types. Western Europe has the highest share of deals driven by the 
shareholder-value maximization and innovation rationales, in line with the 
focus of contemporary state capitalism in supporting the development of new 
industries, processes and products (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2014), while rent-
extraction M&A’s are more concentrated in Eastern Europe, and financial 
distress in Asia, Oceania and the Far East. 
Table 4 - Number of deals by rationales and sectors 
Sector Shareholder-
value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent-extraction Financial distress 
Construction 13 (6%) 2 (4%) - (0%) 1 (3%) 
Electricity 15 (7%) 20 (44%) 7 (15%) 2 (6%) 
Finance 80 (35%) 5 (11%) 4 (9%) 16 (44%) 
Manufacturing, 
agriculture 
33 (15%)    - (0%) 2 (4%) 2 (6%) 
Mining, Oil & gas 13 (6%) 4 (9%) 30 (64%) 1 (3%) 
Other 20 (9%) 1 (2%) 1 (2%) 2 (6%) 
Public Administration 14 (6%) 2 (4%) 2 (4%) 7 (19%) 
Telecom 18 (8%) 5 (11%) 0 (0%) 2 (6%) 
Transport 21 (9%) 6 (13%) 1 (2%) 3 (8%) 
Total 227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
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Table 5 - Number of deals by rationales and period of time 
Sector Shareholder-
value 
maximization (1) 
Innovation (2) Rent-
extraction (3) 
Financial distress (4) Total 
Pre 2008  81 (36%) 12 (27%) 18 (38%) 5 (14%) 116 (33%) 
After 2008 146 (64%) 33 (73%) 29 (62%) 31 (86%) 239 (67%) 
Total 227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 355 (100%) 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
Table 6 - Cross-border deals by rationales 
Type of Rationale Shareholder- 
value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent-
extraction  
Financial 
distress 
Total 
Domestic deals 130 (57%) 26 (58%) 19 (40%) 29 (81%) 204 (57%) 
Cross-border 
deals 
97 (43%) 19 (42%) 28 (60%) 7 (19%) 151 (43%) 
Total 227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 355 (100%) 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
Table 7 - Number of deals by rationales and type of vendor 
Sector Shareholder-value 
maximization (1) 
Innovation (2) Rent-
extraction (3) 
Financial 
distress  (4) 
Total 
Public-public 54 (24%) 11 (24%) 22 (47%) 8 (22%) 95 (27%) 
Public-private 173 (76%) 34 (76%) 25 (53%) 28 (78%) 260 (73%) 
Total 227 (100%) 45 (100%) 47 (100%) 36 (100%) 355 (100%) 
Sources: our elaboration from Zephyr and Orbis (BvD). 
Interesting information can also be obtained by looking at the economic and 
financial characteristics of the acquirers and targets involved in each deal. 
Specifically, we analyze measures of size (total assets, turnover), performance 
(Ebit margin, Return on asset - ROA), and a financial soundness ratio, the year 
prior the deal, in order to analyze the characteristics of deals that belong to the 
“shareholder-value maximization” rationale and to test differences in the 
groups of deals’ motivations. 
Table 8 reports the median value, by rationale group, of the considered 
variables for both acquirer and target involved in each deal, while Table 9 
reports the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (Wilcoxon, 1945; Mann 
and Whitney, 1948), which highlights whether the median value of the 
differences, computed for each deal, is statistically significant. 
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Table 8 - Pre-deal economic characteristics and financial indicators of acquirer  
and target (median value) 
Variables Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent 
extraction 
Financial 
distress 
     
Total asset° of acquirer 1,397,429 17,591,401 17,574,590 1,957,415 
Total asset° of target 140,548 214,427 274,330 844,254 
Turnover° of acquirer 631,272 1,134,622 3,962,076 450,577 
Turnover° of target 91,281 263,574 144,943 406,593 
Ebit margin°° of acquirer 12.61 20.22 33.26 22.82 
Ebit margin°° of target 12.49 9.36 20.34 8.73 
ROA§ of acquirer 7.16 5.81 12.83 4.64 
ROA§ of target 6.73 5.28 8.91 3.06 
Solvency ratio§§ of 
acquirer 
46.20 38.86 58.29 45.10 
Solvency ratio§§ of 
target 
41.25 33.55 38.49 34.44 
     
°thousands of Euro; °°Ebit/Turnover; §Profit before taxes/total asset; §§equity/total asset. 
Source: our elaboration on Zephyr-Orbis: the sample is balanced for each single variable. 
Table 9 - Differences between acquirer and target (median value) 
Variables Shareholder-value 
maximization 
Innovation Rent 
extraction 
Financial 
distress 
     
Total asset°  308,029*** 33,678,936*** 20,540,920*** 428,159** 
Turnover°  203,398*** 739,604** 1,876,507*** 6,639 
Ebit margin°°  0 4.26* 3.03 -2.61 
ROA§  -0.51 0.94 -0.26 -0.80* 
Solvency ratio§§  -1.05 18.98 2.92 0 
     
°thousands of Euro; °°Ebit/Turnover; §Profit before taxes/total asset; §§equity/total asset. 
Source: our elaboration on Zephyr-Orbis: the sample is balanced for each single variable. All 
the absolute values are in Thousand of Euro; the Ratios are in percentage; p-value according 
to the Wilcoxon test: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Regarding “shareholder-value maximization” motives, the results indicate that 
acquirers are larger than their targets along several dimensions, such as total 
assets and turnover, as confirmed by the p-value test of the median value of 
the differences between acquirers and targets. Acquirers also have slightly 
higher performance indicators in terms of Ebit and ROA, as well as a stronger 
solvency situations. According to previous studies (see, in particular, Clò et al., 
2015, pp. 571-575), these deals reveal economic and financial characteristics 
similar, in size and magnitude, to deals performed by private acquirers, 
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strengthening our finding that the majority of deals performed by SOE’s are 
similar to M&A’s performed by private companies. 
Interestingly, comparable results can be detected in all the other groups of 
rationales, with significant differences in magnitude, however. In particular,  
the differences in firms’ characteristics between acquirer and target are greater 
compared to shareholder-value maximization, in terms of total asset, turnover 
and Ebit margin, especially for Innovation and Rent extraction rationales. 
We further analyze the acquirers’ characteristics in relation to the three 
rationale groups that specifically belongs to government-led M&As rationales. 
To do so we use the “Shareholder-Value Maximization” group as our 
benchmark, i.e. we compare acquirer firms’ characteristics in each of the other 
three groups (“Innovation”, “Rent Extraction”, “Financial Distress”) with those 
of the “Shareholder-Value Maximization” group. In Table 10 we report the 
results of the Mann-Whitney test on the differences in the median, for 
rationale groups (acquirers only)9. This table is a subset of the Table 8 where 
we have all the median values (both for acquirer and target) for each rationale. 
Table 10 - Statistical significance test in median distribution for acquirers by groups 
of rationales (‘shareholder value maximization’ as benchmark) 
Variables Innovation Rent extraction Financial distress 
    
Total asset°  16,193,415*** 16,177,161*** 559,986* 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.1253) 
Turnover°  503,350* 3,330,804** -180,695 
 (0.0388) (0.0573) (0.9123) 
Ebit margin°°  7.61* 20.65*** 10.21* 
 (0.0552) (0.0120) (0.0868) 
ROA§  -1.35 5.67** -2.52*** 
 (0.1968) (0.0336) (0.0026) 
Solvency ratio§§  -7.34 12.09* -1.10 
 (0.3001) (0.1430) (0.6986) 
    
°thousands of Euro; °°Ebit/Turnover; §Profit before taxes/total asset; §§equity/total asset. 
Source: our elaboration on Zephyr-Orbis: the sample is balanced for each single variable. All 
the absolute values are in Thousand of Euro; the Ratio are in percentage; p-value in bracket 
according to the Mann & Whitney test, (level of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
                                                          
9
 The Mann & Whitney test (1947) is a nonparametric rank sum test for significance of the 
change in median values.  Since the distribution of the financial variables for the acquirers 
are quite different, we use the Mann-Whitney test to validate the median values. Indeed, 
the test shows if the distributions are independent. 
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The results highlight that, compared to the benchmark group, active SOE’s 
engaged in deals that are driven by a mission to strengthen the government 
competitive position in domestic and cross-border markets - to extract rent 
from mining, subsoil, oil and gas - are national giants and global players that 
are relatively big in size, as measured by total asset and turnover. They also 
seem well-performing in terms of Ebit margin and ROA (although we do not 
investigate the reasons for such performances) as well as strongly capitalized. 
SOE’s that are entering deals to play an active role in the development of 
innovation projects and/or competitive physical and technological 
infrastructures are large in size as well, but with relatively lower levels of 
turnover, given their total assets. This result may be read in the light of the 
specificity of their activities, which are less capital intensive and require more 
long-term investment and returns. While the Ebit margin is statistically higher 
than the benchmark, the ROA is slightly lower (although the p-value is not 
significant); this is likely due to the disproportionately high value of the total 
asset. 
Finally, with deals performed for debt restructuring or bail-out motivations, the 
SOE’s involved have similar total assets but a lower turnover compared to the 
benchmark. Their ROA is lower, not surprisingly, and probably due to a higher 
debt burden, related to their levered financial structure. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The recent literature on SOE’s tends to contradict earlier widespread 
assumptions about their role in the economy in terms of objectives and 
performance. The traditional literature tended to look at SOE’s as captured by 
politicians and overall underperforming relative to private firms. Some authors, 
however, most notably e.g. Musacchio and Lazzarini (2014), point to the 
emergence of a new form of State Capitalism, where SOEs compete with 
private firms with similar strategies and objectives.  This paper contributes to 
this debate by a novel perspective. We look at SOEs from the angle of the 
Market for Corporate Control and we analyze in detail the reported rationales 
of a sample of 355 M&A deals performed by SOE’s as acquirers over the period 
2002-2012; our aim, after having creating a taxonomy of deal rationales, is to 
empirically test two alternative hypotheses: Deviation versus Convergence of 
M&A deal rationales between public and private enterprises. 
We find that more than 60% of the deals performed by SOEs as acquirers are 
driven by “shareholder-value maximization” motives, similarly to private 
enterprise acquirers. The other 40% of deals are almost equally spread among 
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three rationales that specifically relate to the role of modern state capitalism in 
the economy: the development of innovative projects and competitive 
infrastructures (“innovation”), the strengthening of competitive positions to 
extract rents or accumulate resources (“rent-extraction”), and the bail-out of 
financially distressed firms (“financial distress”). The most important finding is 
that the last rationale, which is the only one clearly deviating from the 
objectives of profit maximization typical of private ownership, is by far less 
important than the others. 
Moreover, we have analyzed the deals in terms of such rationales highlighting 
different features according to macro-sector and macro-area variables, and 
economic and financial ratios. Specifically, we find that the rationale 
“shareholder-value maximization” is spread across all sectors and more 
concentrated in Western countries, while “rent extraction” mainly belongs to 
the mining, and oil and gas sectors, with a higher incidence in South and 
Central America and Eastern countries. The “Innovation” rationale is more 
relevant in the electricity industry and in developed countries. Finally, the 
“rescue from financial distress” rationale is typical for acquirers which are not 
the typical contemporary SOE’s, but financial entities and other organizations 
in the public sector, or directly governments. 
As far as accounting indicators, “shareholder-value maximization” deals reveal 
economic and financial characteristics similar, in size and magnitude, to deals 
performed by private acquirers, strengthening our finding that the majority of 
deals performed by SOE’s are similar to M&A’s performed by private 
companies. Compared to this group of deals, “Rent-extraction” M&A’s are 
performed by SOEs that are relatively big in size, and well-performing in terms 
of EBIT margin and ROA. Similarly, “innovation” deals are performed by 
companies which are large in size, but with relatively lower levels of turnover, 
and exhibit an EBIT margin that is statistically higher than the benchmark. SOEs 
engaged in deals performed for debt restructuring or bail-out motivations 
display a lower ROA. 
Overall, these findings suggest that rescue of firms in financial distress, in spite 
of the Great Recession, is a relatively less frequent deal rationale when SOE’s 
are the acquirers compared with shareholder value maximization and long 
term strategic goals. 
While our empirical analysis is based on new evidence, it has some limitations 
that suggest the need for further research. First, it is always difficult to 
precisely ascertain the motivation of managers when they are involved in M&A 
operations. To the best of our knowledge there are no better source of 
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international comparable evidence than the one we use (the combined Zephyr 
and Orbis databases), but it would be interesting to study in detail some cases 
to double check if the reported rationales are good descriptions of the actual 
motivations of a deal. This should be left to future research as it possibly would 
imply field work and the collection of evidence from a variety of sources (with 
some risk in terms of consistency and comparability).  Second, it would be 
interesting to correlate the evidence to the quality of corporate governance 
and to the quality of institutions, along the lines e.g. of Faccio (2006) or Borghi 
et al. (2016), in order to discover if the alignment of objectives between public 
and private enterprises is enhanced by certain features of the public sector 
management, as suggested by the OECD (2015) Guidelines. The last issue may 
suggest also some policy implications, in terms of reforms of the corporate 
governance of the SOEs and accountability of their management against clearly 
stated public missions. It would be important for citizens to be informed in a 
transparent way about the rationales of major M&A deals when a SOE is on the 
acquirer side, and the consistency of such rationales with the mission assigned 
by governments to the enterprises they own. 
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